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Abstract
Interpretations of quantum theory have traditionally assumed a “Galilean” ob-
server, a bare “point of view” implemented physically by a quantum system. This
paper investigates the consequences of replacing such an informationally-impoverished
observer with an observer that satisfies the requirements of classical automata the-
ory, i.e. an observer that encodes sufficient prior information to identify the system
being observed and recognize its acceptable states. It shows that with reasonable
assumptions about the physical dynamics of information channels, the observations
recorded by such an observer will display the typical characteristics predicted by quan-
tum theory, without requiring any specific assumptions about the observer’s physical
implementation.
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ence; Virtual machine; Quantum Darwinism; Quantum Bayesianism; Emergence
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“Information? Whose information? Information about what?”
J. S. Bell ([1] p, 34; emphasis in original)
1 Introduction
Despite over 80 years of predictive success (reviewed in [2]), the physical interpreta-
tion of quantum states, and hence of quantum theory itself remains mysterious (for
recent reviews see [3, 4, 5]). Informally speaking, this mysteriousness results from the
1
apparent dependence of the physical dynamics on the act of observation. Consider
Schro¨dinger’s cat: the situation is paradoxical because the observer’s act of opening
the box and looking inside appears to cause the quantum state of the cat to “collapse”
from the distinctly non-classical superposition |cat〉 = 1√
2
(|alive〉 + |dead〉) to one of
the two classical eigenstates |alive〉 or |dead〉. The introduction of decoherence the-
ory in the 1970s and 80s [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] transferred this mysterious apparently-causal
effect on quantum states from what the observer looks at - the system of interest -
to what the observer ignores: the system’s environment (reviewed by [11, 12, 13]; see
also [3, 4, 5] for treatments of decoherence in a more general context and [14] for a less
formal, more philosophical perspective). Schro¨dinger’s poor cat, for example, inter-
acts constantly with the environment within the box - stray photons, bits of dust, etc.
- and via the walls of the box with the thermal environment outside. Components of
|cat〉 thereby become entangled with components of the environmental state |env〉, a
state that spreads at the speed of light to encompass all the degrees of freedom of the
entire universe (other than the cat’s) as the elapsed time t→∞. To an observer who
does not look at the environment, this entanglement is invisible; the components of
the environment can therefore be “traced out” of the joint quantum state |cat⊗ env〉
to produce an ensemble of non-interfering, effectively classical states of just the cat,
each with a well-defined probability. Such reasoning about what observers do not
look at is employed to derive effectively classical states of systems of interest through-
out the applied quantum mechanics literature. For example, Martineau introduces
decoherence calculations intended to explain why the Cosmic Background Radiation
displays only classical fluctuations with the remarks: “Decoherence is, after all, an
observer dependent effect - an observer who could monitor every degree of freedom
in the universe wouldn’t expect to see any decoherence. However, our goal is to de-
termine a lower bound on the amount of decoherence as measured by any observer
... we trace out only those modes which we must ... and take our system to be com-
posed of the rest” ([15] p. 5821). Noting that the setting for these calculations is the
inflationary period immediately following the Big Bang, one might ask, “Observer?
What observer? Looking at what?”
Ordinary observers in ordinary laboratories interact with ordinary, macroscopic
apparatus in order to gain classical information in the form of macroscopically and
stably recordable experimental outcomes. The reconceptualization of physics as an
information science that developed in the last quarter of the 20th century, motivated
by Feynman’s speculation that all of physics could be simulated with a quantum
computer [16], Wheeler’s “it from bit” proposal that “all things physical ... must
in the end submit to an information-theoretic description” ([17] p. 349), Deutsch’s
proof of the universality of the quantum Turing machine (QTM [18]) and Rovelli’s
explicitly information-theoretic derivation of relational quantum mechanics [19], re-
formulated the problem of describing measurement as the problem of describing how
observers could obtain classical information in a world correctly described by the
quantum mechanical formalism. Theoretical responses to this reconceptualization
can be divided into two broad categories by whether they maintain the standard
Dirac - von Neumann Hilbert-space formalism as fundamental to quantum mechanics
and adopt information-theoretic language to its interpretation, or adopt information-
theoretic postulates as fundamental and attempt to derive the Hilbert-space for-
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malism from them. Responses in the first category treat decoherence as a funda-
mental physical process and derive an account of measurement from it; examples
include traditional relative-state (i.e. many-worlds or many-minds) interpretations
[11, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24], the consistent histories formulation [25, 26, 27] and quantum
Darwinism [12, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. Those in the second treat measurement as a fun-
damental physical process; they are distinguished by whether they treat information
and hence probabilities as objective [33, 34, 35] or subjective [19, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40].
While observers appear as nominal recipients of information in all interpretative
approaches to quantum theory, the physical structure of an observer is rarely ad-
dressed. Zurek [12], for example, remarks that observers differ from apparatus in
their ability to “readily consult the content of their memory” (p. 759), but nowhere
specifies either what memory contents are consulted or what memory contents might
be required, stating that “the observer’s mind (that verifies, finds out, etc.) consti-
tutes a primitive notion which is prior to that of scientific reality” (p. 363-364). Hartle
[26] characterizes observers as “information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes)”
but places no formal constraints on the structure of an IGUS and emphasizes that
the information gathered by IGUSes is “a feature of the universe independent of hu-
man cognition or decision” (p. 983). Rovelli [19] insists that “The observer can be
any physical system having a definite state of motion” (p. 1641). Schlosshauer [3]
adopts the assumption that appears most commonly throughout the literature: “We
simply treat the observer as a quantum system interacting with the observed system”
(p. 361). Fuchs [37] treats observers as Bayesian agents, and not only rejects but
lampoons the idea that the physical implementation of the observer could be theo-
retically important: “would one ever imagine that the notion of an agent, the user
of the theory, could be derived out of its conceptual apparatus?” (p. 8). While
such neglect (or dismissal) of the structure of the observer is both traditional and
prima facie consistent with the goal of building a fully-general, observer-independent
physics, it seems surprising in a theoretical context motivated by “it from bit” and
the conceptualization of physical dynamics as quantum computing.
It is the contention of the present paper that the physical structure of the observer
is important to quantum theory, and in particular that the information employed by
the observer to identify the system of interest as an information source must be taken
into account in the description of measurement. This contention is motivated by the
intuition expressed by Rovelli, that “the unease (in the interpretation of quantum the-
ory) may derive from the use of a concept which is inappropriate to describe the world
at the quantum level” ([19] p. 1638). On the basis of this intuition, Rovelli rejects the
assumption of observer-independent quantum states, an assumption also rejected by
quantum Bayesians [36, 37, 39, 40]. The present paper rejects an equally-deep assump-
tion: the assumption of a “Galilean” observer, an observer that is simply “a quantum
system interacting with the observed system” without further information-theoretic
constraints. As the analysis of Rovelli [19] demonstrates, measurement interactions
between a Galilean observer and a physical system can be described in terms of Shan-
non information, but this can only be done from the perspective of a second observer
or a theorist who stipulates what is to count as “observer” and “system.” The use
of Galilean observers in an information-theoretic formulation of physical theory thus
requires that the identities of “systems” be given in advance. That this requirement
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is problematic has been noted by Zurek, who states that “a compelling explanation of
what the systems are - how to define them given, say, the overall Hamiltonian in some
suitably large Hilbert space - would undoubtedly be most useful” ([41] p. 1818), and
requires as “axiom(o)” of quantum mechanics that “(quantum) systems exist” ([12]
p. 746; [31] p. 3; [42] p. 2) as objective entities. Zurek adopts Wheeler’s [43] view
that the universe itself can be considered to be the “second observer,” and proposes
from this “environment as witness” perspective that decoherence provides the phys-
ical mechanism by which systems “emerge” into objectivity [12, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32].
Decoherence is similarly proposed to be the mechanism by which quantum infor-
mation becomes classical [44] and by which both Everett branches [22, 23] and the
frameworks defining consistent histories [25, 26, 27] are distinguished. By rejecting
the assumption of Galilean observers, the present paper also rejects the idea that
the objective existence of systems can be taken as given a priori, either by an axiom
or by a physical process of emergence. Instead, it proposes that not just quantum
states but systems themselves are definable only relative to observers, and in partic-
ular, that quantum systems are defined only relative to classical information encoded
by observers. An alternative approach to understanding quantum theory in informa-
tional terms is proposed, one that explicitly recognizes the requirement that observers
encode sufficient information to enable the identification and hence the definition of
the systems being observed.
That ordinary observers in ordinary laboratories must be in possession of infor-
mation sufficient to identify systems of interest as classical information sources, not
just instantaneously but over extended time, is uncontroversial in practice. It follows
immediately, moreover, from Moore’s 1956 proof that no finite sequence of obser-
vations of the outputs generated by a finite automaton in response to given inputs
could identify the automaton being observed ([45] Theorem 2; cf. [46] Ch. 6). Hence
ordinary observers are not Galilean. The information employed by an ordinary, non-
Galilean observer to identify a system being observed is “pragmatic” information in
the sense defined by Roederer [47, 48], although as will be seen below, without Roed-
erer’s restriction of such information to living (i.e. evolved self-reproducing) systems.
That observers must encode such pragmatic information in their physical structures
follows from the physicalist assumption - the complement of “it from bit” - that all
information is physically encoded [49]. The notion of an “observer” as a physical
device encoding input-string parsers or more general input-pattern recognizers that
fully specify its observational capabilities underlies not only the design and imple-
mentation of programming languages and other formal-language manipulation tools
(e.g. [50, 51, 52]), but also computational linguistics and the cognitive neuroscience
of perception (e.g. [53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58]).
It is shown in what follows that when the pragmatic information encoded by or-
dinary observers is explicitly taken into account, distinctive features of the quantum
world including the contexuality of observations, the violation of Bell’s inequality
and the requirement for complex amplitudes to describe quantum states follow nat-
urally from simple physical assumptions. The next section, “Interaction and System
Identification” contrasts the description of measurement as physical interaction with
its description as a process of information transfer, and shows how the problem of
system identification arises in the latter context. The third section, “Informational
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Requirements for System Identification” formalizes the minimal information that an
observer must encode in order to identify a macroscopic system - a canonical measure-
ment apparatus - that reports the pointer values of two non-commuting observables.
It then defines a minimal observer in information-theoretic terms as a virtual ma-
chine encoding this minimal required information within a control structure capable
of making observations and recording their results. The following section, “Physical
Interpretation of Non-commutative POVMs” considers the physical implementation
of a minimal observer in interaction with a physical channel. It shows that if the
physical dynamics of the information channel are time-symmetric, deterministic, and
satisfy assumptions of decompositional equivalence and counterfactual definiteness,
any minimal observer encoding POVMs that jointly measure physical action will ob-
serve operator non-commutativity independently of any further assumptions about
the observed system. The fifth section, “Physical Interpretation of Bell’s Theorem,
the Born Rule and Decoherence” shows that the familiar phenomenology of quantum
measurement follows from the assumptions of minimal observers and channel dynam-
ics that are time-symmetric, deterministic, and satisfy decompositional equivalence
and counterfactual definiteness. It shows, in particular, that decoherence can be un-
derstood as a consequence of hysteresis in quantum information channels, and that
the use of complex Hilbert spaces to represent observable states of quantum systems
is required by this hysteresis. The sixth section, “Adding Minimal Observers to the
Interpretation of Quantum Theory” reviews the ontology that naturally follows from
the assumption of minimal observers, an ontology that is realist about the physical
world but virtualist about “systems” smaller than the universe as a whole. It shows
that any interpretative framework that treats “systems” as objective implicitly as-
sumes that information is free, i.e. implicitly assumes that the world is classical.
The paper concludes by suggesting that the interpretative problem of interest is that
of understanding the conditions under which a given physical dynamics implements
a given virtual machine, i.e. the problem of understanding the “emergence” not of
“classicality” but of observers.
2 Interaction and System Identification
The extraordinary empirical success of quantum theory suggests strongly that quan-
tum theory is the correct description of the physical world, and that classical physics
is an approximation that, at best, describes the appearance of the physical world
under certain circumstances. Landsman [4] calls the straightforward acceptance of
this suggestion “stance 1” and contrasts it with the competing view (“stance 2”) that
quantum theory is itself an approximation of some deeper theory in which the world
remains classical after all. This paper assumes the correctness of quantum theory;
Landsman’s “stance 1” is thus adopted. In particular, it assumes minimal quantum
theory, in which the universe as a whole undergoes deterministic, unitary time evo-
lution described by a Schro¨dinger equation. The question that is addressed is how
the formal structure of minimal quantum theory can be understood physically, as a
description of the conditions under which observers can obtain classical information
about the evolving states of quantum systems.
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As emphasized by Rovelli [19], minimal quantum theory treats all systems, in-
cluding observers, in a single uniform way. The interaction between an observer and
a system being observed can, therefore, be represented as in Fig. 1a: both observer
and observed system are collections of physical degrees of freedom that are embedded
in and interact with the much larger collection of physical degrees of freedom - the
“environment” - that composes the rest of the universe. The present paper adopts
a realist stance about these physical degrees of freedom; they can be considered to
be the quantum degrees of freedom of the most elementary objects with which the
theory is concerned. The observer - system interaction is described by a Hamiltonian
HO−S; this Hamiltonian is well-defined to the extent that the boundaries separating
the observer and the system from the rest of the universe are well-defined. In practice,
however, neither the system - environment nor the observer - environment boundaries
are determined experimentally. The degrees of freedom composing the system S are
typically specified by specifying a set {|si〉} of orthonormal basis vectors, e.g. by say-
ing “let |S〉 =∑i λi|si〉.” The set {|si〉} is a subset of a set of basis vectors spanning
the Hilbert space HU of the universe as a whole; it defines a subspace of HU with
finite dimension d that represents S. The state of O, on the other hand, is typi-
cally left unspecified, and the O− S interaction is represented not as a Hamiltonian
but as a measurement that yields classical information. Traditionally, measurements
are represented as orthonormal projections along allowed basis vectors of the system
(e.g. [60]); distinct real “pointer values” representing distinct observable outcomes
are associated with each of these projections. In current practice, the requirement
of orthogonality is generally dropped and measurements are represented as positive
operator-valued measures (POVMs), sets of positive semi-definite operators {Ej } that
sum to the identity operator on the Hilbert space of S (e.g. [59] Ch. 2). As shown by
Fuchs [36], a “maximally informative” POVM can be constructed from a set of d2 pro-
jections {Πj} on the Hilbert space spanned by {|si〉}. The first d components of such
a POVM are the orthogonal projections |si〉〈si|; “pointer values” can be associated
with these d orthogonal components in the usual way.
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(a)
“Observer”
“Environment”
HO−S “System”
(b)
Observer
Information channel
Intervention ✲
✛
Outcome
System
Fig. 1: (a) A physical interaction HO−S between physical degrees of freedom regarded as
composing an “observer” O and other, distinct physical degrees of freedom regarded as
composing a “system” S, all of which are embedded in and interact with physical degrees of
freedom regarded as composing the “environment” E. Boundaries are drawn with broken lines
to indicate that they may not be fully characterized by experiments. (b) A two-way information
transfer between an observer O and a system S via a channel C.
Replacing “physical interaction” with “informative measurement” and henceHO−S
with {Ej } effectively replaces Fig. 1a with Fig. 1b, in which a well-defined observer
obtains information from a well-defined system. The surrounding physical environ-
ment of Fig. 1a is abstracted into the information channel of Fig. 1b. This idea that
information is transferred from system to observer via the environment is made ex-
plicit in quantum Darwinism [30, 31, 32]. However, it is implicit in the assumption of
standard decoherence theory that the observer “ignores” the surrounding environment
and obtains information only from the system; an observer will receive information
from the system alone only if the observer - environment interaction transfers no
information, i.e. only if the information content of the environment is viewed as
transferred entirely through the system - observer channel.
In the case of human observers of macroscopic systems, the information channel
is in many cases physically implemented by the ambient photon field. If the system
of interest is stipulated to be microscopic - the electrons traversing a double-slit
apparatus, for example, or a pair of photons in an anti-symmetric Bell state - the
information channel is often taken to be the macroscopic measurement apparatus
that is employed to conduct the observations. For the present purposes, the system
will be assumed to be macroscopic, and to comprise both the apparatus employed
and any additional microscopic degrees of freedom that may be under investigation.
As Fuchs has emphasized [36, 37], some intervention in the time-evolution of the
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system is always required to extract information; hence the channel is two-way as
depicted in Fig. 1b. The fact that the channel delivers classical information - real
values of pointer variables computed by the component operators of POVMs - imposes
on the observer an implicit requirement of classical states into which these classical
values may be recorded. Viewing observation as POVM-mediated information transfer
thus requires observers also to be effectively macroscopic. Consistent with the above
characterization of both system and observer as embedded in a “much larger” physical
environment, the number of states available to either system or observer will be
assumed to be much smaller than the number of states within HU.
Considering the channel through which information flows to be a physical and
hence quantum system forcefully raises the question of how the observer identifies
as “S” the source of the signals that are received. This is the question that was
addressed by Moore [45] in the general case of interacting automata. Moore’s answer,
that no finite sequence of observations is sufficient to uniquely identify even a classical
finite-state machine, calls into question the standard assumption that the observed
system can be identified, either by the observer or by a third party, as a collection
of physical degrees of freedom represented by a specified set {|si〉} of basis vectors.
Stipulating that the system can be so represented does not resolve the issue; it merely
reformulates the question from one of identifying the system being observed to one
of identifying and employing a POVM that acts on the stipulated system and not on
something else. This latter question is eminently practical: it must be addressed in
the design of every apparatus and every experimental arrangement.
By allowing both the degrees of freedom composing the system of interest and the
operators composing the POVM employed to perform observations to be arbitrar-
ily stipulated, the standard quantum-mechanical formalism systematically obscures
the question of system identification by observers. While it facilitates computations,
placing the “Heisenberg cut” delimiting the domain that is to be treated by quantum-
mechanical methods around a microscopic collection degrees of freedom further ob-
scures the issue, as it introduces an intermediary - the apparatus - that must also be
identified. It has been shown, moreover, that decoherence considerations alone cannot
resolve the question of system identification, as decoherence calculations require the
assumption of a boundary that must itself be identified: a boundary in Hilbert space
that specifies a collection of degrees of freedom, or a boundary in the space of all
possible frameworks or Everett branches that distinguishes the framework or branch
under consideration from all others [61, 62]. Absent a metaphysical assumption not
just of Zurek’s axiom(o), but of the specific a priori existence of all and only the
systems that observers actually observe, the only available sources of such boundary
specifications are observers themselves. The next section examines the question of
what such specifications look like in practice.
3 Informational Requirements for System
Identification
A primary distinction between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics is the
failure, in the former but not the latter, of commutativity between physical observ-
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ables. Implicit in this statement is the phrase, “for any given system.” For example,
[xˆ, pˆ ] = (xˆpˆ − pˆxˆ) 6= 0 says that the position and momentum observables xˆ and pˆ
do not commute for states of any particular, identified system S. An observation
that xˆ and pˆ do not commute for states of two spatially separated and apparently
distinct systems S1 and S2 is prima facie evidence that S1 and S2 are not distinct
systems after all. If S1 and S2 are truly distinct, commutativity is not a problem:
[xˆ1, pˆ2] = [xˆ2, pˆ1] = 0 for all states |S1〉 and |S2〉 operationally defines separability of
S1 from S2, and warrants the formal representation |S1 ⊗ S2〉 = |S1〉 ⊗ |S1〉 of the
state of the combined system as separable. Hence quantum mechanics can only be
distinguished from classical mechanics by observers that know when they are observ-
ing the same system S twice, as opposed to observing distinct systems S1 and S2,
when they test operators for commutativity.
The assumption that a single system S is being observed is indicated in the stan-
dard quantum-mechanical formalism by simply writing down “S” and saying: “Let
S be a physical system ...” In foundational discussions, however, such a facile and
implicit indication of sameness can introduce deep circularity. Ollivier, Poulin and
Zurek, for example, define “objectivity” as follows:
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about
the system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
(p. 1 of [28]; p. 3 of [29])
On the very reasonable assumption that knowing how to identify the system of inter-
est counts as having knowledge about it - exactly what kind of knowledge is discussed
in detail below - this definition is clearly circular: each observer must have “prior
knowledge” to even begin her observations, and the observers must have a “prior
agreement” that they are observing the same thing to arrive at a consensus about
its properties [61, 62]. Hence while the assumption that observers can know that
they are observing one single system over time is natural and even essential to ex-
perimentation and practical calculations, both its role as a foundational assumption
and its relationship to other assumptions that are explicitly written down as axioms
of quantum theory bear examination.
Let us fully specify, therefore, the information that an observer O must have
in order to confirm that [A1,A2] 6= 0 for two observables A1 and A2 and some
physical system S. The situation can be represented as in Fig. 2: O is faced with
a macroscopic system S, and at any given time t can measure a value for either A1
or A2 but not both. For example, S could be a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, including
ion source, vacuum pump, magnet and power supply, and particle detectors. In this
case, A1 and A2 are the spin directions sˆx and sˆz, the meters are event counters, and
the selector switch sets the position of a mask at either of two fixed angles. Let us
explicitly assume that O is herself a finite physical system, that O can make any finite
number of measurements in any order, and that O has been tasked with recording
the values for A1 or A2 along with the time tk of each observation. Let us, moreover,
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explicitly assume that information is physical: that obtaining it requires finite time
and recording it requires finite physical memory. For simplicity, assume also that
the information channel C from S to O has sufficient capacity to be regarded as
effectively infinite; as this channel is implemented by the environment surrounding
the experimental set-up, this assumption is realistic.
b
✻
A1
A1 A2
b ✒
A2
Fig. 2: A macroscopic system S with the observable A2 selected for measurement.
Common sense as well as Moore’s theorem entail that in order to carry out obser-
vations of S, O must encode information sufficient to (1) distinguish signals from S
from other signals that may flow from the channel; (2) distinguish signals from S that
encode information about the positions of the A1−A2 selector switch and the point-
ers P1 and P2 from signals from S that do not encode this kind of information; and
(3) distinguish between signals that encode different positions of the selector switch
and different pointer values for P1 and P2. For example, if S is a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus, O must encode information sufficient to distinguish S from other sys-
tems of similar size, shape and composition, such as leak detectors or general-purpose
mass spectrometers. Once O has identified S, she must be capable of identifying the
mask selector and the event counters, and determining both the position of the mask
and the numbers displayed on the counters. As O is finite, all of the information
that O can obtain about S, the selector switch, the pointers, and the values that
the pointers indicate can be considered, without loss of generality, to be encoded by
finite-precision representations of real numbers. Assuming that one can talk about a
well-defined physical state |C〉 of the channel C, the information that O must encode
in order to identify and characterize S and its components can, therefore, be taken
to be encoded by four operators that assign (indicated by “7→”) fine-precision real
numbers to states |C〉 of C:
SO(|C〉) 7→
{
(s1, ..., sk ) if |C〉 encodes |S〉
NULL otherwise
where the s1, ..., sk are finite real values of a set of control variables of S;
PO(|C〉) 7→
{
(p1, p2) if |C〉 encodes |S〉
NULL otherwise
where (p1, p2) = (1, 0) if the selector switch points to “A1” and (p1, p2) = (0, 1) if the
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selector switch points to “A2”;
AO1 (|C〉) 7→


(a11...a1n ) if |C〉 encodes |P1〉
AND p1 = 1
NULL otherwise
where a11...a1n are finite real values, and;
AO2 (|C〉) 7→


(a21...a2m ) if |C〉 encodes |P2〉
AND p2 = 1
NULL otherwise
where a21...a2m are finite real values. In these expressions, “NULL” indicates that the
relevant operator returns no value under the indicated conditions. The allowed values
of a1k and a2k are the O-distinguishable “pointer values” for A1 and A2 respectively;
they are guaranteed to be both individually finite and finite in number, irrespective of
the size of the physical state space of S, by the requirement that a finite observer O
records them with finite precision in a finite memory. Figure 3 illustrates the action
of these operators on |C〉, assuming that S is in the state shown in Fig. 2.
(a)
b
A1
A1 A2
b
A2
(b) (c)
✻
(d)
 ✒
Fig. 3: State information assigned by the operators (a) SO, (b) PO, (c) AO
1
, and (d) AO
2
on |C〉.
The operator SO assigns state information about all components of S other than the selector
switch and pointers. The operator PO assigns state information about the selector switch only.
The operators AO
1
and AO
2
, respectively, assign state information about the positions of the left-
and right-hand pointers only.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the values of the control variables s1, ..., sk are what
indicate to O that she is in fact observing S and not something else. In the case of the
Stern-Gerlach apparatus, these may include details of its size, shape and components,
as well as conventional symbols such as brand names or read-out labels. In order
for O to recognize these values, they clearly must be real and finite. The control
variables must, moreover, take on “acceptable” values at t indicating to O that S is
in a state suitable for making observations. A Stern-Gerlach apparatus, for example,
must have an acceptable value for the chamber vacuum and the magnets and particle
detectors must be turned on. The entire apparatus must not be disassembled, under
repair, or on fire. The existence, recognition by the observer, and acceptable values of
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such control variables are being assumed whenever “S” is written down as the name
of a quantum system that is being observed. It is commonplace in the literature
(e.g. [63] where this is explicit) to treat quantum systems as represented during the
measurement process by their pointer states alone, but as Figs. 3c and 3d illustrate,
such a “bare pointer” provides no information by which the system for which it
indicates a pointer value can be identified, much less be determined to be in an
acceptable state for making observations.
The operators SO, PO, AO
1
and AO
2
defined above assign finite values, i.e. do
not assign “NULL,” only for subsets of the complete set of states of C. As discussed
above, the information channel C is physically implemented by the environment in
which S and O are embedded. Let HC be the Hilbert space of this environment.
As the environment of any experiment is contiguous with the universe as a whole,
with increasing elapsed time the dimension dim(HC) ∼ dim(HU); HC can therefore
be considered to be much larger than the state spaces of either S or O, and in par-
ticular much larger than the memory available to O. Let SONULL, PONULL, AO1NULL
and AO
2NULL, respectively, be operators defined on HC that assign a value of zero
to all states within HC that do not encode information about the states of S, the
selector switch of S, P1 and P2 respectively, and “NULL” for states within HC that
do encode such information. A POVM {SOk } acting on HC can then be defined as
follows: let SO0 = SONULL, and for k 6= 0 let SOk be the component of SO that assigns
the value sk, normalized so that SO0 +
∑
k 6=0 SOk = Id where Id is the identity op-
erator for HC. The component SO0 of {SOk } is by definition orthogonal to the SOk
with k 6= 0; however, these latter components are not, in general, required to be
orthogonal to each other. The component of {SOk } that assigns the value “ready”
to S, for example, will not in general be orthogonal to components that establish
the identity of S; many parts of S must be examined to determine that it is ready
for use. Practical experimental apparatus are, nonetheless, generally designed to
assure that many non-NULL components of {SOk } are orthogonal and hence distin-
guishable and informationally independent. The vacuum gauge on a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus, for example, is designed to be distinguishable from and independent of
the ammeter on the magnet power supply or the readout on the event counter. In
general, the distinguishability and informational independence of components is an
operational definition of their separability and hence of the appearance of classical-
ity. The practical requirement that observer-identifiable systems have distinguishable
and informationally-independent control and pointer variables is analogous to Bohr’s
requirement [64] that measurement apparatus be regarded as classical.
Additional POVMs {POk }, {AO1k} and {AO2k} can be defined by including PONULL,
AO
1NULL and AO2NULL as 0th components. As in the case of {SOk }, these 0th components
are by definition orthogonal to the others. If S is assumed to be designed so as to
allow only a single kind of measurement to be performed at any given time, and if
all observations are assumed to be carried out at maximum resolution, then the non-
NULL components of {POk }, {AO1k} and {AO2k} can also be taken to be orthogonal.
For simplicity, orthogonality of these components will be assumed in what follows;
the general case can be accomodated by assuming that the components of {POk } that
indicate incompatible measurements are orthogonal, that components of {AO
1k} and
{AO
2k} that assign values at maximum resolution are orthogonal, and by considering
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only these orthogonal components when defining inverse images as described below.
Regarding SO, PO, AO
1
and AO
2
respectively as POVMs {SOk }, {POk }, {AO1k} and
{AO
2k} acting on HC is useful because it removes any dependence on an explicit spec-
ification of the boundaries between C and S or between the selector switch, P1, P2
and the non-switch and non-pointer components of S. These boundaries are replaced,
from O’s perspective, by the boundaries of the O-detectable encodings of S and its
components in HC. Let ǫ be O’s detection threshold for encodings in C; O is able to
record a value sk, for example, only if 〈C|SOk |C〉 ≥ ǫ. Because O is a finite observer,
ǫ > 0; arbitrarily weak encodings are not detectable. Given this threshold, the en-
coding of S can be defined, from O’s perspective, as ∪k(Im−1(sk)), where Im−1(sk)
is the inverse image in HC of the detectable value sk. Because SO0 is orthogonal to
all of the SOk with k 6= 0, the intersection Im−1(SO0 )∩(∪k (Im−1 (sk ))) = ∅; indeed
these inverse images are separated by states for which 0 ≤ 〈C|SOk |C〉 ≤ ǫ for all SOk
with k 6= 0. Let “Im−1{SOk }” denote ∪k(Im−1(sk)); Im−1{SOk } is then the proper
subspace of HC containing vectors to which the POVM {SOk } assigns finite real values
with probabilities greater than ǫ. The proper subspaces Im−1{POk }, Im−1{AO1k} and
Im−1{AO
1k} can be defined in an analogous fashion. As any state |C〉 that encodes an
acceptable value of either the pointer position or the pointer value for either AO
1
or
AO
2
also encodes acceptable values of the sk, it is clear that Im
−1{POk }, Im−1{AO1k}
and Im−1{AO
1k} are properly contained within Im−1{SOk }.
Specifying {SOk }, {POk }, {AO1k} and {AO2k} in terms of the values that they assign
for each state |C〉 of C completely specifies O’s observational capabilities regarding S;
no further specification of S or its states is necessary. The notion that “systems exist”
can, therefore, be dropped; all that is necessary for the description of measurement,
other than observers equipped with POVMs, is that channels exist. By regarding
all POVMs that identify systems or their components as observer-specific (hence
dropping the superscript “O”), the minimal capabilities required by any observer can
be defined in purely information-theoretic terms. Given an information channel C, a
minimal observer on C is a finite system O that encodes collections of POVMs {S ik},
{P ik} and {Aijk} within a control structure such that, for each i:
1. The inverse images Im−1{S ik}, Im−1{P ik} and Im−1{Aijk} for all j are non-
empty proper subspaces ofHC such that Im
−1{S ik} properly contains Im−1{P ik}
and the Im−1{Aijk} for all j.
2. The si
1
, ..., si
ni
are accepted by the control structure of O as triggering the action
of the POVM {Aijk} for which pij = 1.
3. The control structure of O is such that the action on |C〉 with Aijk is followed
by recording of the single non-zero value aijk to memory.
The control structure required by this definition consists of one “if - then - else” block
for each POVM component, organized as shown in Fig. 4 for a minimal observer
with N POVMs {S ik}. Together with the specified POVMs and a memory alloca-
tion process, this control structure specifies a classical virtual machine (e.g. [51]),
i.e. a consistent semantic interpretation of some subset of the possible behaviors of a
computing device. Such a virtual machine may be implemented as software on any
Turing-equivalent functional architecture, and hence may be physically implemented
13
by any quantum system that provides a Turing-equivalent functional architecture,
such as a QTM [18] or any of the alternative quantum computing architectures prov-
ably equivalent to a QTM [59, 65, 66, 67]. Constructing such an implementation using
a programming language provided by a quantum computing architecture is equivalent
to constructing a semantic interpretation of the behavior of the quantum computing
architecture that defines the virtual machine using the pre-defined semantics of the
programming language. As in the classical case, programming languages for quan-
tum computing architectures provide the required semantic mappings from formal
computational constructs (e.g. logical operations or arithmetic) to the operations
of the underlying architecture (e.g. unitary dynamics for a QTM or a Hamiltonian
oracle) [68, 69]; for any universal programming language, however, higher-level inter-
pretations that define specific programs are independent of these lower-level semantic
mappings. Hence from an ontological perspective, a minimal observer is a classical
virtual machine that is physically implemented by a quantum system O that, if not
universal, nonetheless provides a sufficient quantum computing architecture to realize
all the functions of the minimal observer. A physically-implemented minimal observer
interacts with and obtains physically-encoded information from a physically imple-
mented information channel C. Laboratory data acquisition systems that incorporate
signal-source identification criteria and stably record measurement results are mini-
mal observers under this definition. As is the case for all physical implementations
of classical virtual machines, and for all operations involving classically-characterized
inputs to or outputs from quantum computers, the semantic interpretation of a phys-
ical (i.e. quantum) system as an implementation of a minimal observer requires,
at least implicitly via the semantics of the relevant programming language, an in-
terpretative approach to the quantum measurement problem. The consequences of
replacing Galilean observers with minimal observers as defined here for interpretative
approaches to the measurement problem are discussed in Sect. 6 below.
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Fig. 4: Organization of “if - then - else” blocks in the control structure of a minimal observer.
A minimal observer as defined above, and as illustrated in Fig. 4, is clearly not
Galilean; it is rather a richly-structured information-encoding entity. The informa-
tion encoded by a minimal observer is relative to a specified control structure, and is
therefore pragmatic, i.e. used for doing something [47, 48]. Hence a minimal observer
is not just a “physical system having a definite state of motion” or “a quantum system
interacting with the observed system.” Indeed, if considered apart from its physical
implementation, a minimal observer as defined above is not a quantum system at all;
it is a classical virtual machine, an entity defined purely informationally. One cannot,
therefore, talk about the “quantum state” of a minimal observer. The traditional
von Neumann chain representation ([60], reviewed e.g. by [3]), in which the observer
becomes entangled with the system of interest, after which the observer’s quantum
state must “collapse” to a definite outcome, cannot be defined for a minimal observer,
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and the information encoded by a minimal observer cannot be characterized by a von
Neumann entropy. The physical implementation of a minimal observer can be char-
acterized by a quantum state, and hence does have a von Neumann entropy; however,
any physical implementation that provides a Turing-equivalent architecture and suf-
ficient coding capacity will do. The history of compilers, interpreters, programming
languages, and distributed architecures demonstrates that the emulation mapping
from a virtual machine to its physical implementation can be arbitrarily complex,
indirect, and de-localized in space and time; any straightforward interpretation of
von Neumann’s principle of “psychophysical parallelism” as a constraint on the im-
plementation of minimal observers is, therefore, undone by the architecture that von
Neumann himself helped devise two decades after the publication of Mathematische
Grundlagen der Quantenmechanische.
In consequence of their finite supplies of executable POVMs and finite memories,
minimal observers display objective ignorance of two distinct kinds. First, a minimal
observer cannot, by any finite sequence of observations, fully specify the set of states
of C that encode states of any system S, regardless of the size of the state space of
S. This form of objective ignorance follows solely from the large size of HC com-
pared to memory available to O. A minimal observer cannot, therefore, determine
with certainty that any specification of the states of S derived from observations is
complete. If the observational data characterizing S obtained by O are viewed as
outputs from an oracle, this failure of completeness can be viewed as an instance of
the Halting Problem [51, 52]: O cannot, in principle, determine whether any oracle
that produces a specification of the states of S will halt in finite time. This first
form of objective ignorance blocks for minimal observers the standard assumption of
particle physics that the states of elementary particles are specified completely by
their observable quantum numbers, downgrading this to a “for all practical purposes”
specification; it then extends this restriction to all systems, elementary or not. The
second form of objective ignorance is that required by Moore’s theorem: any system
S′ that interacts with C in a way that is indistinguishable using {SOk }, {POk }, {AO1k}
and {AO
2k} from S will be identified by O as S. The information provided to O by
{SOk }, {POk }, {AO1k} and {AO2k} is, therefore, objectively ambiguous concerning the
physical degrees of freedom that generate the encodings in C on which these operators
act. This second form of objective ignorance extends to all systems the indistinguisha-
bility within types familiar from particle physics. Neither of these forms of objective
ignorance can be remedied by further data acquisition by O; they thus differ funda-
mentally from subjective or classical ignorance. As will be shown in the two sections
that follow, these two forms of objective ignorance together assure that the observa-
tional results recorded by a minimal observer will display the typical characteristics
predicted by quantum theory, independently of any specific assumptions about the
observer’s physical implementation.
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4 Physical Interpretation of Non-commutative
POVMs
The definition of a minimal observer given above relies only on the classical concept of
information and the system-identification requirements placed on observers by clas-
sical automata theory, the assumption that the channel C is physically implemented
by the environment, the idea that information is physical, and the formal notion of a
POVM. It provides, however, a robust formal framework with which arbitrary mea-
surement interactions can be characterized. This formal framework makes no mention
of “systems” other than O and C, requires no strict specification of the boundary be-
tween the physical degrees of freedom that implement O and those that implement C,
and makes no assumption that O and C are separable. The physical interpretation of
information transfer by POVMs within this framework thus provides a “systems-free”
interpretation of quantum mechanics with no a priori assumptions about the nature
of quantum states. This interpretation does not violate the axiomatic assumptions of
minimal quantum mechanics in any way; hence it requires no changes in the standard
quantum-mechanical formalism or its application in practice to specific cases.
Let us drop temporarily the assumption of minimal quantum mechanics adopted
in Sect. 2, and assume only that the physical degrees of freedom composing the
coupled system O⊗C, where “O” here refers to the physical implementation of a
minimal observer, evolve under some dynamics H that is time-symmetric and fully
deterministic. A natural, classical “arrow of time” is imposed on this dynamics,
from the perspective of O, by the sequence of memory allocations executed by O’s
functional architecture. From a perspective exterior to O (e.g. the perspective of C),
the minimal observer O is only one of an arbitrarily large number of virtual machines
that could describe the physical dynamics of its hardware implementation; hence
this O-specific arrow of time is unavailable from such an exterior perspective. Any
alternative minimal observer O′ will, however, have its own arrow of time determined
by its own memory-allocation process.
The large size of HC renders the physical degrees of freedom implementing C fine-
grained compared to both the detection resolution ǫ and the memory capacity of any
minimal observer O; in particular, these degrees of freedom are fine-grained compared
to the inverse images of the POVMs {S ik}, {P ik} and {Aijk} with which O obtains
information about an external system S. As illustrated in Fig. 1a, O is implemented
by the same kinds of physical degrees of freedom that implement C; the degrees of
freedom implementing O are, therefore, also fine-grained compared to O’s memory.
Let us assume a weak version of counterfactual definiteness: that the fine-grained
degrees of freedom within the inverse images of the {S ik}, {P ik} and {Aijk} implemented
by any O are well-defined at all times; this assumption is a natural correlate, if not a
consequence, of the realist stance toward physical degrees of freedom adopted in Sect.
2. Note that this assumption of counterfactual definiteness does not apply to the states
of any “system” other than C, and that it applies to states of C without assuming
that C is separable from O. This assumption renders any physical interpretation
based on it a “hidden variables” theory. However, it does not violate the Kochen-
Specker contextuality theorem [70]; indeed it provides a mechanism for satisfying
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it. The “hidden” fine-grained state variables of C are inaccessible in principle to O,
although they fully determine the course-grained measurement results thatO obtains.
As discussed above, no two instances of the execution of a {S ik}, {P ik}, {Aijk} triple
at times t and t′ can be assumed by O to act on the same fine-grained state |C〉,
nor is any measure of similarity or dissimilarity of channel states |C〉 and |C〉′ other
than a {S ik}, {P ik}, {Aijk} triple available to O. All executions by O of a single
measurement {Aijk} are thus contextualized by prior executions of {S ik} and {P ik};
executions of pairs {Aijk} and {Ailm}, commutative or otherwise, are contextualized
by two executions of {S ik} and {P ik}.
Finally, let us assume that the dynamic evolution of C does not depend in any
way on the POVMs or the control structure implemented by O. Given that O is
by definition a virtual machine, this is an assumption that the physical dynamics H
is independent of its semantic interpretation by any observer. This assumption of
decompositional equivalence assures that the allocation by H of fine-grained degrees
of freedom to the inverse images of the {S ik}, {P ik} and {Aijk} are independent of
the information O encodes, and hence of O’s “expectations” about C or H. This
assumption renders the interpretative framework free of “subjective” dependence on
the observer. By ruling out any dependence of H on system - environment boundaries
drawn by observers, it also renders the interpretative framework consistent with the
common scientific practice of stipulating systems of interest ad hoc either demon-
stratively by pointing and saying “that” or formally by specifying lists of degrees of
freedom to be included within the boundaries of the stipulated systems.
With these assumptions, the interpretation of O⊗C is both realist and objec-
tivist about the fine-grained degrees of freedom implementing O⊗C, and free, via
decompositional equivalence, of any dependence on what observables and hence what
descriptions ofC orH are available toO. The physical interpretation of [Aijk ,Ailm ] 6= 0
for POVM components Aijk and Ailm must, therefore, also be realist, objectivist, and
independent of the descriptions available to O. Suppose that at t, C is in a fine-
grained state |C〉 such the action Aijk |C〉 would cause O to record a value aijk and the
action Ailm |C〉 would cause O to record a value ailm ; |C〉 at t is thus in the intersection
Im−1(aijk ) ∩ Im−1(ailm ) of the inverse images of aijk and ailm . In this case, the failure
of commutativity can be expressed intuitively (e.g. [3] Ch. 2) in terms of the physical
dynamics H by a pair of counterfactual conditionals:
If |C〉 ∈ Im−1 (aijk ) ∩ Im−1 (ailm ) at t and O does nothing at t, then at
a subsequent t + ∆t, H|C〉 ∈ Im−1 (aijk ) ∩ Im−1 (ailm ); however, if |C〉 ∈
Im−1 (aijk ) ∩ Im−1 (ailm ) at t and O measures either Aijk or Ailm at t, then
at a subsequent t+∆t, H|C〉 /∈ Im−1 (aijk ) ∩ Im−1 (ailm ).
Figure 5 illustrates this situation, the familiar “dependence of the physical dynamics
on the act of observation” mentioned in the Introduction.
18
(a) (b)
t
Im−1(aijk )
|C〉
Im−1(ailm)
✲
t+∆t
Im−1(aijk )
H|C〉
Im−1(ailm)
t
Im−1(aijk )
|C〉
Im−1(ailm)
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✕
✟✟
✟✟✯
❍❍❍❍❥
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❯
t+∆t
Im−1(aijk )
H|C〉?
H|C〉?
H|C〉?
H|C〉?
Im−1(ailm)
Fig. 5: Dynamic evolution of |C〉 without (a) and with (b) O’s measurement of Aijk or Ailm at t.
Part (b) shows the four possible post-measurement locations of H|C〉 if [Aijk ,Ailm ] 6= 0 .
Implicit in this intuitive formulation of non-commutativity as a counterfactual
conditional, and in Fig. 5a, is the idea that the observer could “do nothing” at t,
thus avoiding the “perturbation” of |C〉 with either Aijk or Ailm . The definition of
a minimal observer, however, permits O to “do nothing” only if the control values
si
1
, ..., sini are not accepted, i.e. only if (to use the usual language of external systems
momentarily) the “system” Si is not identified as “ready” by the POVM {S ik}. If Si
is identified by the action of {S ik} as ready, O deterministically makes an observation
and records a value. The dynamics depicted in Fig. 5a is thus inconsistent with
the condition that |C〉 ∈ Im−1{S ik} at t. Consistency with |C〉 ∈ Im−1{S ik} at t
requires that if |C〉 ∈ Im−1 (aijk ) ∩ Im−1 (ailm ) at t, |C〉 /∈ Im−1 (aijk ) ∩ Im−1 (ailm ) at
an immediately-previous t−∆t. This consistent situation is illustrated in Fig. 6, in
which the uncertainties about the state of C before and after t are symmetric.
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Fig. 6: Dynamic evolution of |C〉 that is consistent at all times with |C〉 ∈ Im−1{S ik} at t.
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Realism and objectivism demand that the forward and reverse dynamics of H
depicted in Fig. 6 receive the same physical interpretation. Viewing the dynamics
symmetrically and considering O’s control structure as shown in Fig. 4 makes the
causal structure of the sequence from t − ∆t to t clear: if the physical evolution of
O⊗C under the action of H results in |C〉 ∈ Im−1 (aijk )∩ Im−1 (ailm ) at t, either Aijk
or Ailm will be executed by O at t, with precedence determined by O’s control struc-
ture. The control structure of O, however, is a virtual machine implemented by the
collection of physical degrees of freedom O, the time evolution of which are driven by
H. Every action of O, therefore, is fully determined by H via the emulation mapping
that defines O as a physically-implemented virtual machine. Far from “dependence
of the physical dynamics on the act of observation,” the transition from t − ∆t to
t illustrates the deterministic dependence of the act of observation on the physical
dynamics. If the dynamics determines the observation from t −∆t to t, however, it
must determine the observation from t to t + ∆t as well. There is nothing particu-
lar to quantum mechanics in this claim: once information is viewed as physical, the
conclusion that an interaction that transfers information from C to O also transfers
information from O back to C follows straightforwardly from Newton’s Third Law.
Given this physical interpretation of non-commutativity as a consequence of the
reaction of O on C that is required by a time-symmetric, deterministic H, O will
observe non-commutativity between any pair of POVMs {Aijk} and {Ailm} with j 6= l
for which the action of H on Im−1(aijk ) alters the subsequent distribution of degrees
of freedom into Im−1(ailm ) for some m or vice versa. Commutativity of {Aijk} and
{Ailm} thus requires that Im−1(aijk ) and Im−1(ailm ) are separable under the dynamics
H for all k and m. Operators that jointly measure the action of H, in particular, will
never satisfy this condition; hence such operators cannot commute. It is impossible,
moreover, for any minimal observer to predict the effect of H on a given Im−1(aijk )
and alter the choice of subsequent measurement to avoid the appearance of non-
commutativity, as doing so would require an ability to represent the state of O⊗C,
a state about which minimal observers are objectively ignorant.
The present framework offers, therefore, a straightforward answer to van Fraassen’s
[71] question “How could the world possibly be the way a quantum theory says it is?”
The world is a physically-implemented information channel, it evolves through the
action of a time-symmetric, deterministic dynamics that satisfies decompositional
equivalence and counterfactual definiteness, and it contains minimal observers imple-
menting pairs of POVMs with non-separable inverse images, in particular pairs of
POVMs that jointly measure action. Within the present framework, the more inter-
esting question is the reverse of van Fraassen’s: what would the world have to be like
for classical mechanics to be true, i.e. for dynamics to be time-symmetric, determin-
istic, satisfy decompositional equivalence and counterfactual definiteness, and for all
possible physical observables to commute? There are two answers. First, the world
would be classical if information transfer required zero time. If information could
be transferred instantaneously, multiple POVMs could act on a single channel state
|C〉 without intervening reactions of O on C. Second, the world would be classical
if observers had effectively infinite coding capacity. With infinite coding capacity,
observers could in principle realize the Laplacian dream of completely modeling H,
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and hence designing time-dependent POVMs with inverse images that accurately pre-
dicted the trajectory from any |C〉 to the unique subsequent H|C〉. These conditions
could both be true if information was not physical. Hence the operator commuta-
tivity required by classical mechanics could be true if information were not physical,
and can be derived given a fundamental assumption that information is not physical,
that information processing in principle costs nothing, is free (c.f. [49] where free
information is identified with classicality). What the empirical success of quantum
mechanics tells us is that information is physical: that information processing is not
free.
5 Physical Interpretation of Bell’s Theorem,
the Born Rule and Decoherence
The previous section showed that, given reasonable, traditional, and not explicitly
quantum-mechanical assumptions about the dynamics driving the evolution of a phys-
ical information channel, any physically-implemented minimal observer equipped with
sufficiently high-resolution POVMs will discover one of the primary features of the
quantum world: pairs of POVMs with mutually non-separable inverse images, includ-
ing pairs of POVMs that jointly measure action, will not commute. This section will
show that minimal observers equipped with sufficiently high-resolution POVMs will
also discover several other canonically “quantum” phenomena. Before proceeding,
however, it is useful to summarize, in Table 1, the meanings given to the fundamental
terms of the standard quantum-mechanical formalism by the formal framework for
describing the O−C interaction developed in the last two sections.
Standard quantum formalism Current framework
Quantum system S, a collection
of degrees of freedom
Im−1({S ik}), the (non-NULL)
inverse image in C of a POVM
Quantum state |S〉 at t Im−1(ajk) in C at t for value ajk
of a POVM component Aijk
Observable A, defined over
states of any quantum system
{A1jk}...{ANjk}, a set of POVMs
defined over states of C
Table 1: Meanings assigned to terms in the standard quantum formalism by the current framework.
As shown in Table 1, the fundamental difference between the current framework
and the standard quantum formalism is the meaning assigned to the notion of a quan-
tum system. In the standard quantum formalism, a quantum system is a collection
of physical degrees of freedom, and any quantum system is observable in principle.
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In the current framework, an observable quantum system is the non-NULL inverse
image, in a physical channel C, of a physically-implemented POVM with a finite num-
ber of finite, real output values. The current framework thus limits quantum theory
by placing an observer-relative, information-theoretic restriction on what “counts” as
an observable quantum system: the POVM {S ik} must be physically implemented by
an observer O in order for the “quantum system” it detects to exist for O. Thus in
the current framework, to paraphrase Fuchs’ [37] paraphrase of de Finetti, “quantum
systems do not exist” as objective, “given” entities. This does not, clearly, mean that
the stuff composing quantum systems does not exist; both C and O are implemented
by physical degrees of freedom. What it means is that their boundaries do not exist.
Systems are defined only by observer-imposed decompositions, and physical dynamics
do not respect decompositional boundaries.
Quantum states are, in the current framework, equivalence classes under the com-
ponents of a POVM {Aijk} of states of C that are indistinguishable, in principle, by an
observer implementing {Aijk}. As discussed in Sect. 3, other than whether |C〉 is iden-
tified by an available POVM {S ik} and the values ajk assigned by the {P ik}-selected
jth available observable {Aijk} that are obtained in the course of a finite sequence
of measurements, observers in the current framework are objectively ignorant about
quantum states. No physical state |C〉 of the channel, and therefore no physical state
of any “system” S, can be either fully characterized or demonstrated to be replicated
by any minimal observer, regardless of the amount of data that observer collects. A
world in which no observer is able, in principle, to identify any quantum state as a
replicate of any other quantum state is, however, equivalent from the perspective of
such an observer to a world in which quantum states cannot be replicated. The ob-
servational consequences of objective ignorance regarding the replication of quantum
states are, therefore, equivalent to the observational consequences of the no-cloning
theorem [72], which forbids the replication of unknown quantum states. These conse-
quences are realized objectively in the current framework for all quantum states, since
all are “unknown” to all observers. In the current framework, the effective inability
to clone quantum states is a consequence of the physicality of information and the
boundarylessness of quantum systems defined as inverse images of POVMs.
In the current framework, no-cloning renders all observational results observer-
specific. Any two observers O and O′ are objectively ignorant about whether the
inverse images of any two POVMs {AOijk } and {AO
′i
lm } are the same subsets of C,
whether these POVMs commute or not. Whether two observers share observables
can, therefore, at best be established “for all practical purposes” by comparing the
results of multiple observations. Hence it cannot be assumed, without qualifications,
that two distinct observers have both measured a single observable such as xˆ for a
single system S. This reflects laboratory reality: whether an observation has been
successfully replicated in all details is always subject to question.
With these understandings of the familiar terms, the physical meaning of Bell’s
theorem [73] for a minimal observer becomes clear. Consider an observer who mea-
sures the same observable on two different “systems” S1 and S2 employing triples
({S1k }, {P1k }, {A1jk}) and ({S2k }, {P2k }, {A2jk}) of POVMs at times t and t+∆t respec-
tively. Between t and t + ∆t, the state of C evolves from |C〉 to H|C〉. Clearly
|C〉 ∈ Im−1 ({S1k }) at t and H|C〉 ∈ Im−1 ({S2k }) at t + ∆t; otherwise the measure-
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ments could not be performed. What is relevant to Bell’s theorem is whether these
inverse images overlap, and in particular, whether Im−1({A1jk}) evaluated at t inter-
sects Im−1 ({A2lm) evaluated at t + ∆t for any j and l. If this intersection is empty,
the measured “states” |S1〉 and |S2〉 are separable. However, the intersection of the
inverse image Im−1({A1jk}) at t and the inverse image Im−1 ({A2jk}) at t + ∆t is
only guaranteed to be empty if H respects the S1 - S2 boundary, and assuming that
H respects the S1 - S2 boundary violates decompositional equivalence. Therefore,
the default assumption must be that Im−1({A1jk}) at t may overlap Im−1 ({A2jk}) at
t + ∆t, and hence that |S1〉 and |S2〉 cannot be regarded as separable. That sep-
arability between apparently-distinct systems cannot be assumed by default is the
operational content of Bell’s theorem, accepting the horn of the dilemma on which
counterfactual definiteness and hence the ability to talk about the inverse images of
POVMs is assumed.
The problem with the classical reasoning that produces Bell’s inequality, on the
current framework, is that it assumes that observers can have perfect information
about distant systems. If O is making a local measurement of S1 at t, and S1 has a
spacelike separation from S2 at t, then O cannot be making a local measurement of
S2 at t. If at some later time t + ∆t O writes down a joint probability distribution
for particular states |S1〉 and |S2〉 at t, O must be in possession at t + ∆t of data
obtained about |S2〉 at t, such as a report of the state of S2 at t from some other
observer, e.g. Alice, that is was local to S2 at t. The delivery of this report from Alice
to O requires a physical channel, with which O must interact, using an appropriate
POVM, in order to extract the information contained in the report. Writing down
the joint probability distribution for |S1〉 and |S2〉 at t therefore requires that O make
two local measurements, one of |S1〉 at t, and one of the report from Alice at the later
time t + ∆t. Only if the inverse images of the two POVMs required to make these
two measurements are separable is the classical assumption of perfect information
transfer from Alice to O warranted. In standard quantum-mechanical practice, O’s
interactions with a macroscopic Alice at t+∆t are assumed to separable from Alice’s
interactions with S2 at t due to decoherence; any entanglement between Alice and S2
is assumed to be lost to the environment in a way that renders it inaccessible to O.
This assumption, however, rests on an implicit assumption that O can distinguish
Alice from the background of the environment without making a measurement of
Alice’s state [62], e.g. before asking for her report. If Alice is microscopic - for
example, if Alice is a single photon - this latter assumption is unwarranted, as is
the assumption that Alice is no longer entangled with S2 at t + ∆t. A minimal
observer, however, cannot identify any system other than by making a measurement
of that system’s state. A minimal observer cannot, therefore, assume that decoherence
has dissipated any previous entanglement into the environment; as will be described
below, for a minimal observer decoherence is a property of information channels,
not an observer-independent property of system-environment interactions. Hence as
discussed above, a minimal observer cannot assume that the inverse images of any two
POVMs are separable; for a minimal observer, the default assumption must be that
any two systems are entangled. A minimal observer cannot, therefore, assume perfect
information transfer from a distant source of data, and hence cannot derive Bell’s
inequality for spacelike separated systems using classical conditional probabilities that
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assume perfect information transfer. For a minimal observer, therefore, the failure
of Bell’s inequality is expected, and the prediction of its failure by minimal quantum
mechanics is positive evidence for the theory’s correctness.
Viewing both quantum systems and quantum states as inverse images of POVMs
also enables a straightforward physical interpretation of the Born rule. Observers are
objectively ignorant, at all times, of both the state |C〉 of the information channel
and the dynamics H driving its evolution. By assuming decompositional equivalence,
however, an observer can be confident that the future evolution of |C〉 will not de-
pend on the locations or boundaries within the state space of C of the inverse images
of the POVMs {S ik}, {P ik} or {Aijk}. Such an observer can, therefore, be confident
that the probability of obtaining an outcome aijk following a successful application of
{S ik}, {P ik} and {Aijk} to |C〉 at some future time t will depend only on the number
of physical states within Im−1(aijk ) relative to the total number of states within of
Im−1({S ik}) at t. The Born rule expresses this confidence that H respects decompo-
sitional equivalence.
Let P (aijk |ij, t) be the probability that O records the value aijk at some future
time t given that O has, immediately prior to t, identified a “system” Si by suc-
cessful application of {S ik} and selected an observable {Aijk} by successful application
of {P ik}. Given these conditions, O deterministically records some value aijk, so∑
k P (a
i
jk |ij, t) = 1. If the POVM {Aijk} is restricted to only the components with
k 6= 0 and hence considered to act only on the subspace Im−1{Aijk} of HC, it can be
renormalized so that
∑
kAijk is the Identity on Im−1{Aijk}. Following the notation
used by Zurek in his proof of the Born rule from envariance [42], let mk be the num-
ber of states in Im−1(aijk ) and M =
∑
k mk be the number of states in Im
−1{Aijk};
Im−1{Aijk} then corresponds to the “counter” ancilla C in Zurek’s proof, each of
the k components of which contains mk fine-grained states. What Zurek shows is
that (in his notation [42] but suppressing phases) if a joint system-environment state
|ψSE〉 has a Schmidt decomposition
∑N
k=1 ak |sk 〉|ek 〉 with ak ∝
√
mk , an ancilla C
of M fine-grained states can be chosen with k mutually-orthogonal components Ck
such that C = ∪kCk and each Ck contains mk fine-grained states. Using the Ck to
count the number of fine-grained states available for entanglement with any given
joint state |sk 〉|ek 〉, Zurek then shows that the probability pk of observing |sk 〉|ek 〉 is
mk/M , which equals |ak |2 by the definition of C, giving the Born rule.
In the present context, the formalism of Zurek’s proof provides a constructive
definition of the unknown future quantum state on which a POVM {Aijk} can act to
produce akjk as a recorded outcome. The inverse image Im
−1{Aijk} is the subset of C
that “encodes” the ”quantum state” of the “system” Si picked out by the POVM {S ik};
the rest of C (i.e. C\Im−1{S ik}) is the “environment” of Si . Hence Zurek’s “|ψSE〉” is
a coarse-grained representation of |C〉, where the coarse-grained basis vectors “|sk 〉”
and “|ek 〉” span the subpaces Im−1{Aijk} and C \ Im−1{S ik} respectively. Given
Zurek’s assumption that all system states are measureable, the |sk 〉 can be readily
identified as the Im−1(aijk ) for the POVM {Aijk}; the |ek 〉 are notional, as they are
for Zurek. Hence the physical content of the Born rule is that, given decompositional
equivalence, the inverse images Im−1(aijk ) can be regarded as coarse-grained basis
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vectors for Im−1{Aijk} that together provide a complete specification of the state of
Im−1{Aijk} as measurable by O. This is in fact the role of the Born rule in standard
quantum theory: it assures that the probabilities P (aijk |ij, t) are exhausted by the
amplitudes (squared) of the measureable basis vectors |sk 〉 of the identified system of
interest.
Interpreting the Born rule in this way provides, in turn, a natural physical in-
terpretation of decoherence. Observers, as noted in Sect. 3, are virtual machines
implemented by physical degrees of freedom. Any “system” identified by a POVM
{S ik} implemented by an observer is, therefore, itself a virtual entity: “quantum sys-
tems do not exist” as objective entities. Decoherence must, therefore, be a virtual
process acting on the information available to an observer, not a physical process
acting on the degrees of freedom that implement C. Representing decoherence in this
way requires re-interpretating it as an intrinsic property of a (quantum) information
channel. Such a re-interpretation can be motivated by noting that the usual physi-
cal interpretation of decoherence relies on the identification of quantum systems over
time and is therefore deeply circular [61, 62].
In standard quantum theory, decoherence occurs when a quantum system S is sud-
denly exposed to a surrounding environment E. The S−E interaction HS−E rapidly
couples degrees of freedom of S to degrees of freedom of E, creating an entangled joint
state in which degrees of freedom “of S” can no longer be distinguished from degrees
of freedom “of E.” The phase coherence of the previous pure state |S〉 is dispersed
into the entangled joint system S−E. Under ordinary circumstances decoherence
is very fast; Schlosshauer ([3] Ch. 3) estimates decoherence times for macroscopic
objects exposed to ambient photons and air pressure to be many orders of magnitude
less than the light-transit times for such objects (e.g. 10−31 s to spatially decohere a
10−3 cm dust particle at normal air pressure versus a light-transit time of 10−14 s). It
is, therefore, safe to regard all ordinary macroscopic objects exposed to the ordinary
macroscopic environment as fully decohered.
It is worth asking, however, what is meant physically by the supposition that S is
“suddenly exposed” to E. If S is “suddenly exposed” to E at some time t, it must have
been isolated from E before t. Call “F” whatever imposes the force required to isolate
S from E. On pain of infinite regress, F must be in contact with E, in which case
decoherence theory tells us that F and E are almost instantaneously entangled. The
interaction of F with S that imposes the force that keeps S isolated will, however, also
entangle S with F. Unless F can be partitioned into separable components F1 and F2
that separately interact with S and E respectively, however, neither |F⊗S〉 nor |F⊗E〉
can be considered to be pure states, and nothing prevents the spread of entanglement
from S to E. Hence unless F can be partitioned into separable components, S has
never been isolated, and can never be “suddenly exposed.” In practice, F is often a
piece of laboratory apparatus such as an ion trap, that interacts with an “isolated”
system on one surface and the environment on another. The assumption that F
can be partitioned into separable systems is, effectively, the assumption of an internal
boundary within F that is not crossed by any entangling interactions. Such an internal
boundary would, however, “isolate” everything inside it, and hence require another
internal boundary to enforce this isolation. Such an infinite regress of boundaries is
impossible; hence no such boundary can exist.
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That this reasoning applies across the dynamical domains defined by the relation
between the self and interaction Hamiltonians of S (e.g. [3, 4]) can be seen by con-
sidering a high-energy cosmic ray that collides with the Earth. During its transit
of interplanetary space and the upper atmosphere, the interaction of the cosmic ray
with its immediate environment is small; it can be considered “isolated” as long as
no measurements of its state are made. Its sudden collision with dense matter (e.g. a
scintillation counter) “exposes” it to the local environment defined by that matter, a
local environment that is contiguous with the larger environment of the universe as a
whole. This “sudden exposure” is, however, an artifact of the limited view of the cos-
mic ray’s history just described. The cosmic ray was produced by a nuclear reaction,
e.g. in the Sun. Prior to that reaction, its future components were fully exposed to
the local environment of the Sun, a local environment that, like the dense matter on
Earth, was contiguous with the larger environment of the universe as a whole. The
pre-reaction entanglement between components of the future cosmic ray and other
components of the Sun, and hence with other components of the universe as a whole,
is not physically destroyed by the formation and flight of the cosmic ray; it is merely
inaccessible to observers on Earth, who are only able to experimentally take note of
the later, local entanglement between the cosmic ray and the Earth-bound matter
with which it collides. It is widely acknowledged that the notion of an “isolated sys-
tem” is a holdover from classical physics; Schlosshauer, for example, notes that “the
idealized and ubiquitous notion of isolated systems remained a guiding principle of
physics and was adopted in quantum mechanics without much further scrutiny” ([3]
p. 1). Yet if quantum systems are never isolated, if all physical degrees of freedom are
entangled at all times with all other physical degrees of freedom, what is the physical
meaning of decoherence?
Standard quantum theory resolves this paradox formally. The formalism distin-
guishes S from E by giving them different names. The representation |S ⊗ E〉 =∑
ij λij |si 〉|ej 〉 of the entangled joint state preserves this distinction, as does the joint
density ρ = 1
2
∑
ij |si〉〈sj ||ei〉〈ej | and its partial trace over E, ρS = 1N
∑N
ij=1 |si〉〈sj |〈ei|ej〉.
These representations all assume, implicitly, that S can be identified against the back-
ground of E; the partial trace additionally assumes, usually explicitly, that O is em-
ploying an observable A⊗ I that measures states of S in some basis but acts as the
identity operator on states of E. It is this latter assumption that is expressed by the
standard proviso that O cannot or does not observe the states of E. Given these
assumptions, however, the claim that decoherence explains O’s ability to distinguish
S from E by providing a physical mechanism for the “emergence of classicality” is
clearly circular: the “emergence” is built in from the beginning by assigning the dis-
tinct names S and E and assuming that they refer to different things. Indeed, the role
of decoherence in standard quantum theory appears to be that of an axiom, some-
what more subtle that von Neumann’s axiom of wave-function collapse, stating that
observers can distinguish quantum systems from their environments even though the
two are always and inevitably entangled. The statement “decoherence is a physical
process” thus appears entirely equivalent to Zurek’s “axiom(o).”
To see how “axiom(o)” is employed in practice, consider the now-classic cavity-
QED experiments of Brune et al. [74] (reviewed in [3] Ch. 6), in which decoherence of
a mesoscopic “Schro¨dinger cat” created by coupling a well-defined excited state of a
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single Rb atom to a weak photon field inside a superconducting cavity is monitored as
a function of time and experimental conditions. In the standard language of quantum
systems and states, the system S in this case provides two observables, the state
e (excited) or g (ground) of an Rb atom after it has traversed the cavity, and the
correlation Pij(∆t) between the states of successive atoms i and j arriving at the
detector with a time difference of ∆t. The experimental outcomes are: (1) varying
the coupling between the atomic state and the photon field varies the amount of
information about the traversing atom’s state that was stored in the field ([74] Fig.
3); and (2) varying the time interval ∆t varies the amount of information about
the ith atom’s state that could be extracted from the jth atom’s state ([74] Fig.
5). The first result demonstrates that increasing the local interaction between two
identified degrees of freedom (by increasing the coupling) increases the entanglement
between those degrees of freedom. The second result demonstrates that after the local
interaction between the two identified degrees of freedom (after the ith atom leaves
the cavity), the entanglement between those degrees of freedom dissipates; the field
in the cavity is also entangled with the atoms in the walls of the cavity, and this
latter entanglement decoheres the “information” about the ith atom’s state that “the
atom leaves in (the cavity) C” ([74] p. 4889). Critical to this explanation is the tacit
assumption that the states of the atoms in the walls of the cavity are not themselves
observed, or equivalently, that the atoms in the walls of the cavity are themselves
entangled with the general environment in which the apparatus is embedded. But,
this assumption comes with the implicit proviso that this prior system - environment
entanglement does not prevent the identification of quantum states of the individual
Rb atoms traversing the cavity. This assumption that the individual Rb atoms can
be regarded “objectively” even in the presence of system - environment entanglement
is an instance of “axiom(o).”
The current framework alters this standard account of the physics by re-casting
it in informational terms and rejecting the tacit assumption that the ith and jth Rb
atoms are distinguishable quantum systems. The “system” SB in this framework
(“B” for Brune et al.) is the inverse image of a POVM {SBk } with control vari-
ables sB
1
, ..., sB
nB
. Distinct acceptable sets of values of these variables describe distinct
preparation conditions for the system. This system can be considered an information
channel from Im−1({ABg ,ABe }) to O, where the components of AB report the out-
comes g and e respectively. In this representation, long-lived entanglement between
the atom traversing the cavity and the photon field within it causes delocalization
in time of the outcome: the values of the control variables sB
1
, ..., sB
nB
- specifically,
those indicating the mirror separation and hence tuning of the cavity - can be ad-
justed in a way that smears an outcome g (for example) out over pairs of applications
of AB . Figure 7 illustrates this smearing in time using a simple circuit model, in
which the (approximately) fixed “resistance” R represents information loss from the
channel (e.g. the approximately fixed coupling of the photon field to the cavity) and
the variable “capacitance” C represents the intrinsic memory of the channel (e.g. the
manipulable coupling of the atomic beam to the photon field). An instantaneous
input impulse δ(t − t0) at t = t0 results in an output ∝ e−t/RC for t > t0 at O. The
time constant RC is the decoherence time; it is a measure of the channel’s memory
of each outcome.
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Figure 7: Simple circuit model of decoherence in an information channel Im−1({SBk }).
The “capacitance” C in Fig. 7 is clearly a measure of the “quantum-ness” of the
channel; as C → 0, the channel appears classical. The condition C = 0 corresponds to
infinite temporal resolution for measurement events; hence it corresponds to the “free
information” (i.e. ~→ 0) assumption of classical physics discussed at the end of Sect.
4. If C = 0, the channel stores no information about previous outcomes, so all pairs
of POVMs, including those that jointly measure action commute. The “resistance”
R measures the leakiness of the channel in either direction; as R → 0, the channel
approaches infinite decoherence time, i.e. perfect isolation, in the quantum (C > 0)
case, and the ideal of noise-free communication in the classical (C = 0) case.
Given the representation of an information channel as an RC circuit, consider a
random sequence of measurements with the POVM {ABg ,ABe }. These measurements
correspond to a random sequence of “states” of Im−1({ABg ,ABe }). The no-cloning
theorem requires that these “states” be non-identical, and hence that the collections
of fine grained states |C(t)〉 that physically implement them be non-identical. The in-
dividual measurement outcomes cannot, therefore, be “remembered” at C as identical;
the “memory traces” of distinct |C(t1)〉 and |C(t2)〉 stored at C must interfere. From
O’s perspective, this interference can be represented formally by adding a random
phase factor e−iφ to each transmission through the channel. Without such interfer-
ence, the signal at O would increase monotonically with time if measurements were
made with a time separation less that RC, since C would never fully discharge. Such
arbitrarily temporally-delocalized outcomes are never observed in practical experi-
ments. Adding the random phase term assures that, for t≫ RC, interference between
measurements drives the time-averaged signal at O toward zero. In this purely infor-
mational RC-circuit model of decoherence, therefore, no-cloning is what requires the
use of a complex Hilbert space to represent “states” in the inverse image Im−1({Aijk})
of any observable associated with an identified system. Treating the Im−1(aijk ) as
names of coarse-grained basis vectors for the “system” Im−1({S ik}) as discussed above,
an unknown quantum state of Im−1({S ik}) as measured at a future time t using the
jth available POVM Aijk can be written |ψij(t)〉 =
∑
k αke
−iφk |Im−1(aijk )〉 with αk
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real, exactly as expected within standard quantum theory.
A “quantum channel” defined solely by non-commutativity between observables
jointly measuring action is, therefore, a quantum channel as defined by standard
quantum theory, provided that information is physical and the observer is a minimal
observer as defined in Sect. 3. If determinism, time-symmetry, counterfactual def-
initeness and decompositional equivalence are assumed, observations made through
such channels satisfy the Kochen-Specker, Bell, and no-cloning theorems. The Born
rule emerges as a consequence of decompositional equivalence. Complex phases are
required by objective ignorance of the physical states implementing the channel, i.e.
by no cloning. Decoherence is understandable not as a physical process acting on
quantum states, but as an intrinsic hysteresis in quantum information channels. Mea-
surement, in this framework, is unproblematic; if minimal observers exist, the deter-
minate, “classical” nature of their observations follows straightforwardly from their
structure as classical virtual machines and the physics of a quantum channel. The fun-
damental interpretative assumptions that must be added to quantum theory appear,
then, to be that information is physical and that minimal observers exist.
6 Adding Minimal Observers to the Interpre-
tation of Quantum Theory
If Galilean observers are replaced by minimal observers as defined in Sect. 3, the
interpretation of quantum theory is radically simplified. The traditional problems
of why some measurement bases, such as position, are “preferred” and how super-
positions can “collapse” onto determinate eigenstates of those bases are immediately
resolved: a minimal observer “prefers” the bases in which she encodes POVMs, and
is only capable of recording eigenvalues in these bases. The problem of the “emer-
gence” of the classical world also vanishes: the classical world is the world of recorded
observations made by minimal observers. Minimal observers are virtual machines im-
plemented by physical degrees of freedom; hence the classical world is a virtual world.
What the current framework adds to previous proposals along these lines (e.g. [75])
is a precisely formulated model theory: the model theory expressed by the POVMs
implemented by the minimal observer.
From an ontological perspective, the current framework can be viewed as an in-
terpolation between two interpretative approaches generally regarded as diametrical
opposites: a “pure” relative-state interpretation such as that of Tegmark [22] and
the quantum Bayesianism (“QBism”) of Fuchs [37]. Like QBism, the current frame-
work views quantum states as observer-specific virtual entities. However, instead of
“beliefs” as they are in QBism, these virtual entities are inverse images of observer-
specific POVMs in the space of possible states of the real physical world. Like a pure
relative-state interpretation, the current framework postulates a deterministic, time-
symmetric Hamiltonian satisfying counterfactual definiteness and decompositional
equivalence. However, “branching” into arbitrarily many dynamically-decoupled si-
multaneous actualities is replaced by the classical notion that a sufficiently complex
physical system can be interpreted as implementing arbitrarily many semantically-
independent virtual machines. Like QBism, the current framework rejects the in-
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terpretation of decoherence as a physical mechanism that generates actuality; unlike
QBism, it views the “classical world” as entirely virtual and rejects the observer-
independent “real existence” of bounded, separable macroscopic objects. Like a pure
relative-state interpretation, the current framework embraces non-locality as an in-
trinsic feature of the universe; unlike a pure relative-state interpretation, it views non-
locality as a temporal relationship between instances of observation, not as a spatial
relationship between objects. The current framework is, therefore, ontologically very
spare. It postulates as “real” only the in-principle individually unobservable physical
degrees of freedom that implement both channel and observer. The virtual machines
that are postulated are not in any sense physical; unlike Everett branches [22], there
is no sense in which virtual machines constitute parallel physical actualities. This
strongly Kantian ontology is similar to that of the recent “possibilist” extension [76]
of the transactional interpretation [77, 78], but without the notion that transactions
“actualize” quantum phenomena in an observer-independent way.
What the current interpretative framework emphatically rejects is the notion that
the “environment” is a witness that monitors quantum states and defines systems for
observers. The idea that the environment preferentially encodes certain “objective”
quantum states and makes information about these states and not others available to
observers is the foundation of quantum Darwinism [12, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. It is im-
plicit, however, in all interpretative approaches in which the classical world “emerges”
from the dynamics in an observer-independent way. The bounded and separable “real
existences” postulated by QBism [37], for example, are effectively the observations of
the “rest of the universe” viewed as an observing agent [79]. The “witness” assump-
tion can be found in interpretative approaches as distant in terms of fundamental
assumptions from both QBism and quantum Darwinism as the possibilist transac-
tional interpretation, where an “experimental apparatus seems persistent in virtue
of the highly probable and frequent transactions comprising it” ([80] p. 8) not from
the perspective of an observer, but from the perspective of an observer-free universe.
It is this assumption of emergence via environmental witnessing that enables, ex-
plicitly or otherwise, the traditional and ubiquitous assumption of information-free
Galilean observers, mere points of view or (as “preparers” of physical systems) points
of manipulation of a pre-defined objective reality.
As pointed out in the Introduction, the logical coherence of Galilean observers
must be rejected on the basis of classical automata theory alone [45, 46]. It is useful,
however, to examine the Galilean observer from the perspective of the “environment
as witness.” Consider the classic Wigner’s friend scenario [81], but with an omniscient
“friend” who monitors not just an atomic decay but the states of all possible “systems”
in the universe. An observer can then obtain information about the state of any system
by asking his friend, i.e. by interacting with the local environment as envisaged by
quantum Darwinism. A minimal observer asks his friend in language, by executing
a POVM. The information that such an observer can obtain from the environment,
whether viewed as a communication channel or as an omniscient oracle, is limited by
the observer’s repertoire of POVMs; a minimal observer can obtain no information
about a system he cannot describe, and cannot “observe” that a system is in a state
he cannot represent and record. A Galilean observer, in contrast, stores no prior
information and hence has no language. Having an omniscient friend does not help
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a Galilean observer; they have no way to communicate. The assumption that a
Galilean observer can nonetheless obtain any information encoded by the environment
is, effectively, the assumption that the observer has the same encoding capacity as
the environment: what is “given” to the omniscient environment is also “given” to
the Galilean observer. This assumption was encountered at the end of Sect. 3; it is
the familiar, classical assumption that information is free.
Replacing Galilean observers with minimal observers replaces the intractable philo-
sophical problem of why observers never observe superpositions - a pseudoproblem
that results from the informationally-impoverished and hence unconstrained nature
of the Galilean observer - with two straightforwardly scientific problems. The first
is a problem in quantum computer science: what classical virtual machines can be
implemented by a given quantum computer, e.g. by a given Hamiltonian oracle [65]?
One answer to this question is known: a quantum Turing machine [18] can implement
any classical virtual machine. A second, more practical, answer is partially known:
the quantum systems, whatever they are, that implement our everyday classical com-
puters are Turing equivalent. What we do not know is how to describe these familiar
systems quantum mechanically, or how to approach the analysis of an arbitrary quan-
tum system capable of implementing some limited set of classical virtual machines.
The second problem straddles the border between machine intelligence and biopsy-
chology. It is the question of what physically-realized virtual machines share POVMs,
and of how these systems came to share them. If we are to understand how multiple
observers can reach an agreement that they are observing the same properties of the
same thing, it is this question that we must be able to answer.
7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the consequences of replacing the Galilean observer tra-
ditionally employed in interpretations of quantum theory with an observer that fully
satisfies the requirements of classical automata theory. It has shown that if both
the observer and the information channel with which it interacts are implemented by
physical degrees of freedom, the state space of which admits a linear measure enabling
the definition of POVMs, and if the temporal dynamics of these physical degrees of
freedom are deterministic, time symmetric, and satisfy decompositional equivalence
and counterfactual definiteness, then the observations made by the observer are cor-
rectly described by standard quantum theory. Quantum theory does not, therefore,
require more than these assumptions. The unmotivated and ad hoc nature of the
formal postulates that have been employed to axiomitize quantum theory, both tra-
ditionally [60] and more recently (e.g. [34, 39]) can be seen as a side-effect of the
assumption of Galilean observers and the compensatory, generally tacit assumption
of “axiom(o).”
The introduction of information-rich minimal observers into quantum theory brings
to the fore the distinction between Shannon or von Neumann information defined
solely by the dynamics and pragmatic information defined relative to an emulation
mapping that specifies a control structure and hence a virtual machine. A determin-
istic, time-symmetric Hamiltonian conserves fine-grained dynamic information; the
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von Neumann entropy of the channel C is zero. Nonetheless, the pragmatic informa-
tion - the list of observational outcomes - recorded by a minimal observer with an
approximately ideal memory increases monotonically with time. Pragmatic informa-
tion appears, therefore, not to be conserved; “history” appears actual, objective and
given. This apparent asymmetry is, however, illusory. Pragmatic information is only
definable relative to an emulation mapping, a semantic interpretation of C. Every
classical bit encoded by a minimal observer must be computed when such an emu-
lation mapping is specified. Hence pragmatic information is not free; it is balanced
by the computational effort required to specify emulation mappings. This effort is
“expended” by H as dynamic evolution unfolds; minimal observers and the outcomes
that they record are the result. “It from bit” is thus balanced by “bit from it.”
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